The New Delhi summit offers evidence of warmer engagement. It offers much less evidence that India has abandoned its reservations about Beijing.
A summit photograph can make a foreign-policy shift look simpler than it is. Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping met in New Delhi on 12 September, with India hosting the BRICS leaders’ summit and the two neighbours discussing how to improve their relationship. For anyone asking whether India has recently embraced BRICS wholeheartedly, the timing is striking. But the more revealing evidence lies in what the governments agreed to discuss—and what remains unresolved.
The answer is a qualified yes on engagement, and a much more cautious answer on alignment. India is putting diplomatic effort into BRICS and into repairing its relationship with China. That does not establish that New Delhi has accepted a China-led geopolitical programme or decided to organise its foreign policy around opposition to the West.
What has actually changed?
The immediate development is renewed high-level contact. Associated Press reported the Modi–Xi meeting on 12 September as another effort to repair relations damaged by the deadly 2020 border clash. Meeting under India’s BRICS presidency gives that effort political visibility. It also gives both governments a setting in which cooperation can be presented as serving a wider international purpose.
The summit has produced a collective outcome as well. India’s public broadcaster reported unanimous adoption of the New Delhi Declaration on its first day. Modi called for reform of international institutions and for the summit’s commitments to become practical results. This is active participation in shaping the organisation, not merely attendance.
There is a wider context. In a pre-summit assessment on 8 September, Chatham House’s Chietigj Bajpaee linked India’s renewed investment in relationships with Beijing and Moscow to strains with Washington. His analysis also highlighted India’s simultaneous pursuit of other trade and resource partnerships. Read together, those choices suggest diversification: India wants more options when any one relationship becomes difficult.
A stronger commitment is not a new identity
BRICS is not a club India has just discovered. India’s own presidency briefing places this year’s summit within a long-running programme of cooperation among emerging economies. Its 2026 priorities include resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability. Those priorities allow New Delhi to pursue development and institutional reform without promising agreement with every member on every security question.
The historical comparison matters. In a November 2023 interview, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar distinguished a non-Western grouping from an anti-Western one and rejected the idea that India saw itself as an anti-Western country. A busier BRICS calendar is therefore insufficient evidence of a reversal. The test would be whether India now accepts commitments that contradict that earlier position.
This weekend’s language does include criticism of Western policy. AP’s summit report describes the bloc’s condemnation of sanctions not authorised by the United Nations and concern about attacks on civilian and peaceful nuclear infrastructure. Yet the same report quotes Modi saying, “BRICS is not against anyone.” That combination matters: India can join criticism of particular policies while declining to define the organisation as an opposing camp. It is evidence of selective convergence, not unconditional agreement.
One useful indicator is money. Bajpaee’s September assessment describes India’s emphasis on national-currency trade settlements and cheaper digital payments, while distinguishing these from a rival reserve currency. Those are different propositions. Making a cross-border payment easier does not, by itself, mean adopting a common currency or transferring financial influence to China.
The China thaw comes with conditions
India’s official account of the 12 September meeting is warm but specific. Modi and Xi welcomed progress since their August 2025 meeting in Tianjin. Modi also reiterated that peace in the border areas is essential to developing the relationship and that existing border agreements must be observed. The leaders expressed commitment to a mutually acceptable boundary resolution; they did not announce that one had been achieved.
The economic agenda is similarly revealing. The Indian readout identifies structural trade imbalance, supply-chain concerns and predictable market access as matters requiring attention. It also calls for more cultural exchanges, business connections and mobility. This is a programme for managing and improving a difficult relationship, with outstanding problems named directly.
China’s official readout places stronger emphasis on partnership, common development and coordination in multilateral organisations. It advocates progress on the broader relationship and the boundary question in parallel. That emphasis should be attributed to Beijing rather than treated as an agreed Indian interpretation of every issue. Both accounts support the existence of a thaw; neither turns diplomatic reassurance into proof that strategic distrust has disappeared.
What BRICS can—and cannot—do for the relationship
BRICS can provide repeated opportunities for leaders and officials to meet, support practical cooperation and reduce the political cost of talking. The inference is straightforward: a forum that both countries want to keep functioning creates reasons to contain disagreements. It does not remove the disagreements or provide a substitute for a border settlement.
Nor is the expanded grouping a single strategic actor. In a June analysis for Carnegie India, Vrinda Sahai identified tensions between enlargement and institutional coherence. She noted that the May foreign ministers’ meeting produced a chair’s statement and outcome document, with recorded differences over West Asia, rather than an ordinary joint statement. September’s declaration is a diplomatic achievement against that background, but it cannot be read as erasing the interests that made consensus difficult.
For India, the opportunity is to use BRICS to increase its influence while making cooperation with China more predictable. The risk is that stronger engagement could be interpreted as acceptance of Beijing’s priorities even when New Delhi intends something narrower. That is why implementation matters more than the warmth of summit language.
Watch the follow-through
The next evidence should come from the border, market access and the practical movement of people and goods. Sustained calm, observance of agreements and progress on the economic concerns named by India would make the thaw more substantial. New friction or unfulfilled promises would expose its limits.
For AIE readers following India from abroad, a summit is best understood as an opening rather than a guarantee of easier business or travel. The documents describe objectives; the benefits depend on decisions that follow.
India’s BRICS stance has become more visibly engaged in a difficult international environment. Calling it a wholehearted embrace of China’s worldview goes beyond the available evidence. What New Delhi appears to be pursuing is a larger role in BRICS alongside a more workable relationship with Beijing, while retaining the right to bargain, disagree and cultivate other partners. That is a meaningful adjustment in diplomacy. It is not yet evidence of a change of camp.
Sources and reporting note
This original analysis draws on the linked Indian and Chinese official statements, AP reporting, Akashvani’s summit report, and dated research from Chatham House and Carnegie India. Government readouts are attributed accounts of official positions; the conclusions and forward-looking assessments are AIE Editorial’s analysis. Research checked on 13 September 2026 (UTC).
